Since emotions give contradictory signals about animal experimentation in medical science, man's relationship to animals must be based upon reason. Thomas Aquinas argues that man is essentially different from animals because man's intellectual processes show evidence of an abstract mechanism not possessed by animals. Man's rights arise in association with this essential difference. The consequence is that only man possesses true rights by Aquinas's definition; animals have them only by analogy. However, cruelty to animals is illicit and they should be (...) protected, principally not because they have rights, but because he who is cruel to animals is more likely to be cruel to his fellowman. If there is a need for animal experimentation in science for the good of man, this approach gives philosophical justification for experimentation, since man's well-being must come before that of animals because of his unique possession of rights. However, those experiments should be carried out in the kindest way possible, to promote kindness towards man. To see man as solely part of a biological continuum in competition for rights with those beings close to him biologically, detracts from man's dignity. (shrink)

An accessible, higher-level introduction to a key selection of continental European thinkers from Spinoza to Zizek. Covering 'classical' exponents of the tradition such as Hegel and Marx, 'moderns' like Gramsci and Habermas and 'postmoderns' like Lacan and Deleuze, the volume introduces the main ideas of each thinker and reflects on their enduring theoretical relevance. The impressive breadth and contemporary angle make this a unique, up-to-date collection that will be invaluable to students and teaching staff alike.

The field of behavioural economics has produced a number of valuable insights into the psychology of irrational behaviour, consumerism and morality. One particularly interesting line of research is that of dishonesty, especially the episodic dishonesty of generally honest people. Currently, an experimental paradigm examining these kinds of research questions is being undertaken, and, using Dan Ariely's Predictably Irrational as a starting point, can broaden the scope of behavioural economics to consider philosophically salient issues as well. In this article, a survey (...) of the ability of behavioural economics to investigate traditionally philosophical questions, as well as moral issues, will be undertaken. A particular focus will be the discussion of further research directions made available by the paradigm of “experimental philosophy” and how behavioural economics can inform this project, followed by a discussion of the current experimental paradigm, and why this research will have larger consequences in a number of social dimensions. (shrink)

We elaborate the kind of metaphysical, ontological arguments and positions put forth by Martin and Sugarman in several ways, in an attempt to clarify that it is the assumption of psychological and sociocultural entities as fixed ontological categories that makes psychological—sociocultural dualism problematic, not the necessary distinction it draws between sociocultural and psychological processes. In so doing, we develop an emergent, mutable metaphysics and ontology for psychological and sociocultural processes that emphasizes their dynamic interrelation. We then attempt to articulate and (...) defend a neorealist hermeneutics as a viable epistemological accompaniment to this dynamic, interactionist metaphysics, and to indicate its appropriateness to psychological inquiry in particular. (shrink)

In reaction to the other papers in this special issue, the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer is further clarified, especially with respect to the ethical sense evident in Gadamer's work, and in that of a younger generation of critical hermeneuts. This discussion sets the stage for a critical questioning of the ability of psychologists, given their past and current disciplinary and professional horizons, to engage a hermeneutic solution to the problem of fragmentation in psychology.

In ‘Minds, Machines and Gödel’, 1961, J. R. Lucas proposed that Godel's theorem made possible a refutation of mechanism—the thesis that mind is wholly comprehensible as a consistent, rule-governed machine. A sympathetic reading of Lucas's argument might run something as follows: ‘If I am a machine then it will be possible in principle to give a specification of the consistent formal system, L, that represents me. If this formal system were handed to me, I would be able to prove a (...) Gödel sentence, G, which L could not generate—that is, L could not model my proving G. But since I have proved G, L is inadequate as a model of my cognitive process.’. (shrink)